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AGORA: REFLECTIONS ON RJR NABISCO V. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
 
OUT-BEALE-ING BEALE 
Carlos M. Vázquez* 
In response to the 1991 Supreme Court decision resuscitating the presumption against extraterritoriality 
[hereinafter “PAE” or “presumption”], EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),1 Larry Kramer described 
the presumption as an anachronism—a throwback to the strict territorialist approach to choice of  law that 
prevailed before the mid-Twentieth Century but has been mostly abandoned since then.2 The title of  his scath-
ing article, Vestiges of  Beale, referred to Joseph Beale, the Harvard Law professor and reporter of  the First 
Restatement of  Conflict of  Laws, whose since-discredited theories underlay that Restatement’s approach to 
choice of  law. In the cases since Aramco, the Court has strengthened and expanded the presumption. With its 
decision in RJR Nabisco v. European Community, it is fair to say, the Court has out-Beale’d Beale.3 
The PAE as Our Choice-of-Law Rule for Federal Statutes  
The presumption against extraterritoriality functions as a choice-of-law rule. Like other choice-of-law rules, 
it determines the geographic scope of  a statute (or other law) when the legislature hasn’t specified its territorial 
scope. As a choice-of-law rule, however, the PAE is a distinctly old-fashioned one. It closely resembles the 
rigidly territorialist and now largely discarded choice-of-law rules embodied in the First Restatement, under 
which a state’s law was deemed applicable when a particular event occurred on its territory. For example, the 
First Restatement’s choice-of-law rule for tort cases was lex loci delicti, under which the applicable law was that 
of  the state in which the injury occurred. Thus, a statute regulating issues that arise in tort cases would be 
deemed applicable only if  the injury occurred in the state’s territory.   
The First Restatement’s rules were thought to follow from then-prevailing theories about the nature of  sov-
ereignty and rights. Beale singled out the place of  injury as the state whose law applied in tort cases because, 
under his “vested rights” theory, a tort arises at the time when, and in the place where, the last event necessary 
to give rise to a claim occurs, and an injury is the last event necessary to give rise to a tort claim. Blistering 
scholarly critiques of  the vested rights theory made clear that there was nothing magical about the last event, 
and the Supreme Court eventually recognized that a state’s tort law could just as validly extend to disputes 
having other connections to the state.4 Most U.S. states have abandoned the First Restatement approach in 
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1 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) 
2 Larry Kramer, Vestiges of  Beale: Extraterritorial Application of  American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 184 (1991). 
3 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
4 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
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favor of  one of  a number of  “modern” approaches.5 Many states have adopted the approach of  the Second 
Restatement of  Conflicts,6 which rejects the First Restatement approach in favor of  a more open-ended search 
for the state with the “most significant relationship” to the matter at hand. Other states have adopted some 
version of  governmental interest analysis.7  
The Supreme Court followed a similar trajectory for federal statutes. At first, the Court adhered to the First 
Restatement-like presumption against extraterritoriality.8 Later, it applied a more case-specific choice-of-law 
approach closer to that of  the Second Restatement in some cases,9 while in others it adopted an approach 
resembling governmental interest analysis.10 In Aramco, the Court ignored these intervening cases and reverted 
to the presumption against extraterritoriality.   
The Court no longer defends its First Restatement-like approach to extraterritoriality on the ground that it 
is inherent in the nature of  sovereignty or rights. The Court has provided two other rationales for the presump-
tion, but neither fully explains its choice of  the PAE as our federal choice-of-law rule. First, the Court has 
explained that the PAE is based on the assumption that Congress legislates with domestic situations in mind. 
This, however, is the same assumption that underlies all choice-of-law rules. This assumption merely poses the 
question of  whether and how far the statute should be construed to apply extraterritorially; it does not answer 
the question. In states that follow the Second Restatement’s approach, this assumption leads the courts to 
construe statutes to apply if  the forum is the state with the most significant relationship to the dispute. The 
second rationale for the presumption is that it avoids unintended clashes with the laws and policies of  other 
states. But this, too, fails to explain the Court’s choice of  the PAE over other choice-of-law approaches. The 
Second Restatement’s approach, too, is designed to avoid clashes with the laws and policies of  other nations, 
as are some versions of  governmental interest analysis.  As Larry Kramer persuasively argued, the PAE signif-
icantly overprotects the interest in international comity, as it results in non-application of  U.S. law in many cases 
in which the law’s purposes would be advanced and no significant clashes with the laws and policies of  other 
states would result.11   
There are, nevertheless, plausible reasons for rejecting an approach like that of  the Second Restatement. That 
approach has been criticized for its indeterminacy and complexity. That this is the part of  the reason the Court 
has rejected this approach is suggested by the Court’s opinion in Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A, which 
rejected such an approach in the antitrust context because it was “too complex to prove workable.”12 Empagran 
suggests that the Court has opted to overprotect the interest in international comity in order to simplify the 
judicial task and provide more certainty and predictability to regulated parties. But, since the Court in Empagran 
did not adopt the PAE for antitrust cases, this too is an incomplete explanation for the Court’s adoption of  the 
PAE.   
 
5 See Symeon Symeonides, Choice of  Law in American Courts in 2015: Twenty-Ninth Annual Survey, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 221, 291 (2016) 
(only 10 states adhere to First Restatement approach in tort cases and 12 in contracts cases). 
6 See id. (24 states adhere to Second Restatement approach in tort cases and 23 in contracts cases). 
7 Id. 
8 See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 247 (1909). 
9 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). 
10 See Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948). 
11 See Kramer, supra note 2, at 215-217. 
12 Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A, 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004). As the Court explained, “[t]he legally and economically 
technical nature of  that enterprise means lengthier proceedings, appeals, and more proceedings to the point where procedural costs and 
delays could themselves threaten interference with a foreign nations’ ability to maintain the integrity of  its own antitrust enforcement 
system.” 
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Some state courts have sought to develop an intermediate choice-of- law approach, less indeterminate than 
that of  the Second Restatement yet less arbitrary and potentially overbroad in avoiding international or inter-
state friction as that of  the First Restatement.13 The Court in Morrison seemed to take a small step in this 
direction by linking the PAE to the “focus” of  congressional concern and recognizing that context can be 
consulted in ascertaining congressional intent.14 As explained below, the Court in RJR has taken a giant step in 
the opposite direction. 
Perhaps the Court sees the PAE as a penalty default rule, one that chooses a rule that Congress is unlikely to 
have wanted in order to prompt Congress to address the issue of  extraterritorial scope itself. If  so, the rule has 
been remarkably successful: Congress quickly revisited the extraterritorial scope of  the statutes involved in 
Aramco and Morrison. Whether we can expect similar congressional correction of  undesirable outcomes in to-
day’s era of  congressional deadlock is questionable. In any event, if  that is among the rule’s purposes, the RJR 
decision significantly increases the penalty.   
RJR’s Dramatic Expansion of  the PAE  
The most significant holding of  RJR is that the PAE applies separately to a statute’s substantive and remedial 
provisions.15 The plaintiffs in RJR brought suit pursuant to Section 1964(c), which gives injured parties a treble 
damages remedy if  they were injured in their business or property by a violation of  RICO’s substantive provi-
sions. The Court held that, even though Congress made clear that the substantive provisions of  RICO apply 
extraterritorially, Section 1964(c) does not apply extraterritorially unless Congress also clearly enough evinced 
its intent that this remedial provision was to have extraterritorial effect.16   
In examining whether Congress had expressed a clear enough intent that this provision apply extraterritori-
ally, the Court framed the question as whether Congress had indicated its intent that the remedy extended to 
injuries occurring outside the United States. Finding no such intent, the Court held that the remedy provided in 
Section 1964(c) was available only for injuries occurring within U.S. territory. The Court did not explain why 
the issue turned on congressional intent regarding the place of  injury, or why, in the absence of  such intent, 
 
13 See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). 
14 The Court nevertheless made clear that the question under the PAE is not what Congress “would have wanted,” Morrison v. Nat’l 
Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010), which is the lodestar under governmental interest analysis. 
15 The Court maintained that it had already established this point in Kiobel, in which it had inquired into whether a federal common 
law cause of action to enforce certain norms of customary international law norms applied extraterritorially “even though the underlying 
substantive law consisted of well-established norms of international law, which by definition apply beyond this country’s borders.” RJR, 
136 S. Ct. at 2106, slip op. at 19. This seems to be an implicit endorsement of the “modern position” that customary international law 
has the status of federal law. If customary international law had no status as federal law in the absence of federal incorporation into our 
legal system, as revisionists maintain, then Kiobel would have involved a single federal law that simultaneously incorporated and created 
a private right of action for certain substantive rules of customary international law. Under the revisionist view, Kiobel would not have 
established the need for a separate showing of the extraterritorial effect of a federal law’s substantive and remedial provisions. On the 
revisionist view, there was no federal law imposing the substantive obligations involved in Kiobel apart from the law creating the remedy. 
16 One of  the ambiguities in the RJR opinion is whether a separate showing is also necessary for Sections 1964(a) and (b), which 
provide for criminal enforcement and civil penalties. Most commentators have assumed that the Court did not contemplate a separate 
showing of  congressional intent for these provisions. But the Court seemed to be drawing a broader distinction between substantive 
provisions and enforcement provisions. The majority did not say that a separate showing of  congressional intent is unnecessary for 
these governmental enforcement provisions. On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion took the majority to be holding 
that the no separate showing of  extraterritoriality was necessary for those provisions, and the majority did not challenge her reading of  
its opinion. I will therefore assume that the majority was not contemplating a separate showing of  congressional intent for these provi-
sions. The Court did not explain why the PAE permits a distinction between proceedings brought by the U.S. government and others 
but not between proceedings brought by foreign governmental plaintiffs and those brought by private plaintiffs. See Anthony J. Colan-
gelo, The Frankenstein’s Monster of  Extraterritoriality Law, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 51, 55 (2016). For a possible basis for the first distinction, 
see Paul B. Stephan, Private Litigation as a Foreign Relations Problem, 110 AJIL Unbound 40 (2016). 
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the statute created a right of  action only for domestic injuries. Scholars have argued that the Court focused on 
the place of  injury because Section 1964(c) authorizes recovery only for injuries, thus suggesting that injury is 
the “focus” of  this section.17 But an injury is only one of  several elements of  a right of  action under Section 
1964(c).18 The Court did not explain why it singled out the place of  injury instead of  these other elements of  
the cause of  action.   
If  the Court’s holding extends to all cases in which injury is an essential element of  the cause of  action, then 
it applies to all private rights of  action. Injury is equally essential to recovery under the private rights of  action 
involved in Aramco, Morrison, and Kiobel. Indeed, the Court this term made clear that “actual injury” is a consti-
tutional requirement of  maintaining a suit for injunctive relief  or damages in federal court.19 Yet the Court’s 
prior PAE cases did not single out the place of  injury. In Morrison, the Court held instead that, if  the statute 
does not have extraterritorial effect, the private right of  action extends to cases in which the substantive “focus” 
of  congressional concern occurred in the United States. The Court’s holding in RJR that private rights of  action 
under federal statutes extend only to domestic injuries (in the absence of  congressional intent to authorize re-
covery for foreign injuries) thus represents a novel and dramatic extension of  the PAE. 
Perhaps the difference between this case and the previous ones is that only this case involved a statute that 
used the term “injury.”20 If  the new requirement applies only to statutes creating a right of  action that use the 
word “injury,” then presumably it would apply to all private rights of  action created by statute. Under this 
theory, the reason for the inapplicability of  this new requirement to the rights of  action involved in Aramco, 
Morrison, and Kiobel, would be (ironically) that those rights of  action were not created by Congress at all but 
were instead implied by the courts. The Court is usually more stringent rather than more lenient in such circum-
stances. Even if  the injury requirement does not appear in statutory text, a showing of  injury is no less (and no 
more) a “focus” of  implied rights of  action than of  express ones.   
Whatever the basis for this new limitation, the effect of  the majority’s holding, where it applies, is to narrow 
significantly the scope of  U.S. statutes that do not evince any congressional intent on the question of  geographic 
scope. At first blush, this new requirement might be thought to be one more vestige of  Beale. As discussed 
above, the First Restatement rule for torts was that forum law applies only if  the injury occurred in the forum 
state. The Court in RJR did not cite the First Restatement, but its holding might be thought to be a resurrection 
of  this ancient rule. 
On closer analysis, however, the majority’s holding narrows the scope of  U.S. law to a much greater extent 
than would adoption of  the lex loci delicti rule. Under the First Restatement’s rule for torts, a law applies when 
the injury occurred within the state even if  all the other events relevant to the claim occurred outside the state. 
Under the RJR holding, the requirement that the injury have occurred on U.S. soil applies in addition to the 
 
17 See William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 45, 48 (2016). 
18 Recovery under that section also requires a showing that the defendant committed the predicate acts, engaged in a “pattern” of  
racketeering activity, etc. If  the Court had focused on the place of  the conduct causing the injury rather than the injury itself, its holding 
would have been different. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, Section 1964(c) incorporated by reference the very same provisions 
that were incorporated by reference into the substantive provisions of  RICO, which the Court found sufficient in that context to rebut 
the PAE. 
19 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1829 (2015). 
20 Such a limitation does not appear to be supported by the majority’s opinion, which discussed the text of Section 1964(c) only to 
show that it did not reveal a congressional intent that the Section apply extraterritorially. The majority did say that, “if anything,” the 
fact that Section 1964(c) permits recovery only for injury to “business or property” shows that Congress did not intend this section to 
be coextensive with the substantive provisions of RICO. See RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2108, slip op. at 22-23.  It is true that Section 1964(c) 
permits recovery only for a subset of injuries suffered. It is not clear what, if any, relevance this limitation bears on whether the statute 
further limits recovery to domestic injuries. Nevertheless, the Court’s reliance on this aspect of the RICO right of action might support 
limiting RJR’s requirement of domestic injury to statutes that authorize recovery for only a subset of injuries suffered.   
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requirements articulated in prior PAE cases. The Court in RJR found that Congress had clearly enough ex-
pressed its intent that the substantive provisions of  RICO apply extraterritorially. On the Court’s analysis, 
however, the outcome for statutes that do not specifically address the extraterritoriality issue (which choice-of-
law theory regards as the usual case) is that recovery is limited to cases in which both the substantive “focus” of  
congressional concern and the injury occurred on U.S. soil.      
Consider how the Court’s prior PAE cases would have come out under this approach. In Morrison, the Court 
held that the substantive provisions of  the Securities Exchange Act apply when the sale of  the security occurred 
on U.S. territory or if  the security was listed on a U.S. exchange. Under the analysis in RJR, recovery would be 
further limited to injuries suffered on U.S. soil. In Kiobel, the Court concluded that, because the PAE had not 
been rebutted, ATS claims must “touch and concern” the territory of  the United States. Here, too, RJR’s anal-
ysis would further limit the plaintiffs’ recovery to injuries that occurred on U.S. soil. In Aramco, the Court held 
that the statute applied if  the plaintiff  was employed in the United States. Congress amended the statute in 
response to Aramco, specifying that it applies to some cases in which the plaintiff  was employed outside the 
United States. As others have noted, however, since Congress did not specify that the right of  action extends 
to foreign injuries, the amended statute under RJR would authorize recovery only for domestic injuries.21 
The majority’s approach in RJR might reflect the Court’s broader hostility to private rights of  action. In a 
series of  closely-divided decisions, the Court has progressively tightened the requirements for recognizing a 
private right of  action under a statute that does not expressly provide one.22 RJR might be regarded as extending 
this line of  cases by insisting that, even when Congress expressly creates a private right of  action, it must 
additionally make clear its intent that the right of  action applies extraterritorially. The Court’s citation of  Sosa’s 
discussion of  these cases suggests that the majority regards the two lines of  cases as related. Still, RJR takes 
this hostility to new lengths. Congress in RICO not only expressly created a private right of  action, it also made 
clear that the right of  action extends to foreign conduct. The Court’s additional requirement that the injury 
must occur in the United States appears to have come out of  whole cloth. 
RJR’s addition of  this requirement garnered only four votes. It was the opinion of  a “majority” only because 
of  Justice Scalia’s passing and Justice Sotomayor’s recusal. The dissenting opinion was forceful and persuasive. 
The dissenting Justices might nevertheless feel constrained to adhere to the decision for reasons of  stare deci-
sis.23 Stare decisis, after all, operates most strongly in statutory cases. But RJR is a statutory case only insofar as 
it construed RICO. To the extent it seeks to alter the PAE as our generally applicable choice- of-law rule for 
federal statutes, RJR articulates a broader rule of  federal common law. Because of  the radical nature of  the 
Court’s extension of  the PAE, and the retroactive revision of  prior PAE holdings and congressional responses 
 
21 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Scope and Limitations of  the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 62, 64 (2016); 
Pamela K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism, AJIL UNBOUND 57, 59 (2016). 
22 Indeed, RJR is reminiscent of  the 5-4 decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), in which the Court sliced up Title 
VI for purposes of  inferring a private right of  action in manner comparable to RJR’s slicing up of  RICO for purposes of  applying the 
PAE. Congress had expressly created a private right of  action for damages under Section 601 of  Title VI. Section 602 authorized the 
Department of  Justice to promulgate regulations in furtherance of  Section 601, but the Court found insufficient legislative intent to 
authorize private rights of  action for violation of  Section 602 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.   
23 But cf. Shuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary 
(BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1644-1645 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the fact that Carolene Products was decided by 
a four-Justice majority as a reason not to follow it); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 615-19 (1975) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (similar argument regarding 4-3 decision in Fuentes v. Shevin). 
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thereto that would result if  this extension were broadly applied, the Justices should seriously consider not ap-
plying the new “injury” requirement beyond RICO. The unexplained nature of  the new “domestic injury” 
limitation would, indeed, support a decision abandoning this new limitation altogether.24    
 
24 Cf. Seminole Tribe of  Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (overruling prior decision because it “reached a result without a 
rationale agreed upon by a majority of  the Court”). 
